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14 April 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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USSR-Berlin: On the eve of the resumption of US-Soviet talks on Berlin, Izvestia has published an article by its authoritative commentator on Berlin and German affairs which underscores Moscow's position that new access guarantees could be negotiated without difficulty if the West agreed to a change in the status of West Berlin which would terminate the "occupation regime." The Izvestia article sought to convey the USSR's readiness to enter serious bargaining on the question of an international access authority by reaffirming the proposal made last month by East German party chief Ulbricht that an arbitration body composed of the guarantor countries be established in connection with a new Berlin agreement. This scheme is designed to provide a facade of continuing Soviet responsibility for Allied access by stipulating that the USSR would act as the arbitration body's agent in settling any access dispute which may arise between East Germany and the West.

Although both Izvestia and the Ulbricht speech called for the replacement of Western "occupation troops" by UN or neutral contingents, an East German deputy foreign minister hinted, in a recent interview with an Indian correspondent, that token Western forces might remain in West Berlin.

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*USSR--Nuclear Testing: [The Khrushchev's harsh and offensive letter to Prime Minister Macmillan delivered yesterday was intended to counter what the Soviet leaders regard as a Western move to place responsibility on the USSR for the impending US test series in the Pacific. The letter, a reply to Macmillan's cover letter to the US-British statement on nuclear testing, denounced the joint statement as an attempt to "divert popular wrath"; it charged that the US and Britain did not expect the Soviet Union to accept their terms for a nuclear test-ban agreement and had already decided beforehand to proceed with the tests.]

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[The Soviet premier revived old allegations that the Western powers have aggressive intentions against the USSR, that they want to retain West Berlin as a "beachhead for the struggle against Communism," and that they are seeking to conduct espionage in the USSR under the guise of a test-ban inspection system. Khrushchev reiterated that Western tests will oblige the Soviet Union to resume testing. He attempted to contrast Soviet and Western attitudes by declaring that the USSR will renounce testing "forever" if the West will do the same, and by offering to go anywhere at any time to sign a general disarmament treaty.]

[The letter to Macmillan probably is the opening salvo in a vigorous campaign to exploit US tests to place the West on the defensive on the whole range of East-West issues. Pravda has joined the attack by castigating the US and Britain for rejecting the Soviet proposal at Geneva for a moratorium on all tests for the duration of the disarmament talks. It is unlikely that the Khrushchev letter and accompanying propaganda foreshadow any immediate hardening of the Soviet position in negotiations with the US on Berlin or any sharp intensification of harassments of Western access to the city.]


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
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USSR-Morocco-Algeria: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] helicopters were included in the recent Soviet shipment of arms delivered at Casablanca [REDACTED] these helicopters are intended for the Algerian National Army (ALN). Moroccan officials have repeatedly assured US representatives that Morocco will receive no helicopters or additional airplanes from the USSR. Rabat in this way is seeking to avoid jeopardizing current negotiations for the supply of military air transport equipment from the US.

Since late 1960 the USSR has on several occasions used Morocco as a transshipment point in supplying arms to the ALN. If the Soviet Union is shipping helicopters to the Algerians, it is doing so in order to maintain its position as a supplier of arms to the Algerians, to assist Algeria from the outset in its efforts to create a modern army, and to forestall French efforts to induce the future Algerian Government to rely solely on France for arms. Now that the cease-fire is in effect, Moscow may feel that limited, indirect arms shipments to the Algerians would not provoke French political retaliation beyond that which followed the USSR's de jure recognition of the PAG last month.

However, if the materiel actually is destined for Algeria, De Gaulle will react sharply and may even break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

*Communist China - India: In a briefing on Sino-Indian relations to the delegates of the National People's Congress now meeting in Peiping, the Chinese Communist regime charged that India has "pushed forward step by step into Chinese territory" during the past year, set up new military outposts, and made repeated overflights across Chinese territory. Peiping insisted that it would be "dangerous" for India to attempt to alter the status quo along the boundary by unilateral action and said that it was holding the door open for negotiations. New Delhi's position has been that formal negotiations cannot begin until Chinese forces have withdrawn from the disputed territory.

The congress delegates were also told of India's refusal to renew the 1954 treaty governing trade with Tibet, which lapses this June. The treaty embodied China's first formal commitment to the so-called "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence"; Peiping seems especially concerned over the effect on Asian neutrals of India's imputation that the Chinese have dishonored these principles.

[REDACTED]

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Burma: The Burmese Foreign Office has informed the Rangoon representatives of the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation that the government has decided it can no longer accept aid from private organizations and has instructed them to wind up their projects requiring foreign advisers within six

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months. The Fulbright Board was requested to withhold assignment of all persons to Burma during 1962. These moves arose from Ne Win's nationalism and distrust of all non-Burmans, even including the minorities of Burma, and are a continuation of Ne Win's efforts, launched during his 1958-60 caretaker government, to isolate his country from alien influences. [REDACTED]

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Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk has become increasingly concerned over the situation in South Vietnam and now is considering the advisability of proposing an international conference. He fears that the increasing US military presence in South Vietnam, while perhaps stabilizing the situation temporarily, will eventually threaten Cambodia's security. Sihanouk attempted to take a leading role last year in solving the Laotian crisis, and he apparently considers the time ripe for similar efforts to neutralize South Vietnam. A recent editorial in Sihanouk's personal press organ advocated international guarantees of the 17th parallel, liquidation of the Diem regime, and demilitarization of South Vietnam.

Both Peiping and Hanoi have indicated their interest in "joint consultations" among the 1954 Geneva Conference powers, presumably on the assumption that the US, if engaged in a conference, would not further enlarge its commitment in South Vietnam. The USSR, however, in a 17 March Foreign Ministry statement issued as one of the two Geneva Conference cochairs, avoided any call for a conference. [REDACTED]

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Turkey: Political tensions are again building up in Turkey over the question of pardons for the military officers involved in the coup attempt on 22 February 1962 and amnesty for members

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of the former Menderes regime. Prime Minister Inonu has promised, as a part of the settlement between the rebels and the government, that the officers involved in the abortive February revolt would not be prosecuted. He is expected to introduce a draft law to this effect next week.

Extremist members of the Justice party, which participates with Inonu's Republican People's party in the coalition government, are opposed to such legislation unless it is tied to an amnesty for many of the imprisoned civilian leaders of the Menderes government. Military leaders are unanimously opposed to such an amnesty and have told US officials in Ankara that linking of the two issues by the Grand National Assembly would lead to another military take-over. Observers in Turkey believe that failure to gain passage of the bill granting pardons to the officers would probably result in Inonu's resignation and immediate military intervention.

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Burma Moves Toward Authoritarianism and Isolationism

General Ne Win, who participated in the nationalist revolutionary movement which forced the British out of Burma in 1948, has little formal education and far less foreign travel and experience than most Burmese leaders. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Burmese and aliens alike have found Ne Win a difficult man with whom to negotiate.

A senior Foreign Office official has informed the American ambassador that the decision to terminate Ford and Asia Foundation activities was not aimed at American or Western institutions in particular, but at all private assistance programs. On the basis of Ne Win's previous record, it may be expected that Chinese Communist and Soviet economic aid programs as well as the private programs will face increased difficulties. During his 1958-60 regime, Ne Win fired all alien advisers paid by the Burmese Government and canceled a number of Soviet "gift" assistance projects--repayable in Burmese rice. The only peoples who have thus far escaped his suspicions have been the Israelis and the Yugoslavs, representatives of small independent countries for which the Burmese have developed a liking and respect.

Ne Win has acted in a similar fashion in the military field. To remove British influence from the post-independence Burmese Army, he convinced the government in 1953 to abrogate the military training agreement with the United Kingdom. He welcomed the signing in 1958 of the US-Burmese military equipment sales agreement--a program he continues to support--but by late 1959 he had become concerned by an "excessive" American influence in his army. He shelved indefinitely the establishment

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of a National Defense College, which would have required some American staffing, and sharply reduced the number--never more than 40--of US military advisers.

The special problems of the Asia and Ford Foundations in Burma may stem from two additional factors. Both organizations received their authorization from former Prime Minister Nu, and many of their projects have been those especially favored by him. The present military regime, like Nu's last administration, may be attempting to eliminate programs of the preceding government. More serious, however, [REDACTED] both foundations--always with Burmese Government approval--have been active with projects among the minority peoples of the Shan and Kachin states, whose loyalties to Burma Ne Win doubts. [REDACTED]

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Cambodian Chief Considers Conference on South Vietnam

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Sihanouk has long envisaged a neutral zone in Southeast Asia, extending from South Vietnam through India, as a means of eliminating military rivalry in the area between the two world blocs. In a recent speech Sihanouk expressed his pleasure that Communist China had proposed a conference.

Hanoi and Peiping, charging that US aid to Diem threatened their own security, have tried to raise war fear in neutral Asia. Between veiled warnings, however, the suggestion has been planted that the "peace of Indochina can be safeguarded" if the 1954 Geneva powers take appropriate action to terminate US military assistance to South Vietnam.


The Communists probably reason that a conference on Vietnam would offer them the advantages of putting international pressure on the US not to enlarge its military commitment during the talks and of providing a platform from which the North Vietnamese could press for their own solution--reunification elections. If the West turns down a conference proposal, the bloc will attempt to convert this to its advantage by alleging that the West has rejected a "peaceful solution."

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